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The US and Latin America: What Lies Ahead? (ARI) 
 
Ray Walser * 
 
 
Theme: On 4 November American voters will choose the 44th President of the United 
States. While the voters have learnt much about the US presidential candidates’ views on 
Iraq, Afghanistan and other key foreign policy issues, little has been said about relations 
with Latin America. Despite its importance to the US, Latin America has not emerged as a 
significant topic of debate in the campaign. 
 
 
Summary: Both candidates promise to forge stronger relations with Latin America. The 
Democratic candidate Barack Obama promises a relationship of equality among states 
and a ‘bottom-up’ approach to reducing poverty. The Republican candidate John McCain 
will look to trade and open markets to reignite growth and development. Neither candidate 
has addressed the impact of the current global financial crisis on future relations with Latin 
America. 
 
Important differences between McCain’s and Obama’s policies towards Latin American 
revolve around a few key issues, notably Cuba, the Colombia free trade agreement, 
homeland security/immigration and how to deal with resurgence of anti-American radical 
populism. The arrival of a new Administration in January 2009 will require building on the 
substantial legacy of the Bush Administration and forging new ties with key Latin 
American states in a period of major international economic turbulence and in the context 




Analysis: The 2008 US presidential electoral campaign has focused very little on US-
Latin American relations. Only in the last presidential debate did the candidates directly 
raise a Latin American policy issue: the pending Free Trade Agreement with Colombia. 
McCain called for its approval by Congress, while Obama demanded enhanced protection 
for Colombian labour leaders. Other than the debate, the candidates have limited their 
discussions on Latin American policy issues to a few speeches, although McCain did 
make a quick July visit to Colombia and Mexico. 
 
Undoubtedly, the next US President and his foreign policy team will face a Latin America 
that is more nuanced, more divided and less certain about the region’s future. The new 
Administration will encounter a Latin America concerned about the prospects for 
continued economic expansion after five years of steady growth and already beginning to 
suffer from the initial impact of an anticipated global economic slowdown. 
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Several key geopolitical factors will greatly influence the capacity of the next 
Administration to articulate a regional policy that is genuinely different from the policy 
pursued by the Bush Administration: 
 
(1) Despite the importance of Latin America to the interests of the US, the region will 
continue to play second fiddle as major foreign policy challenges focus the next 
occupant of the White House on critical challenges such as: keeping Weapons of 
Mass Destruction (WMDs) out of the hands of terrorists; securing a stable, 
democratic Iraq; turning back the continued onslaught of al-Qaeda and the Taliban 
in Afghanistan and Pakistan; and deterring Iran and North Korea from acquiring 
nuclear weapons. Russia’s new assertiveness coupled with China’s continued 
strategic rise will also predominate grand strategic thinking in Washington. Europe, 
India, Taiwan, South Korea, Turkey and Israel-Palestine will all garner greater 
attention than Latin America as these massive geopolitical challenges will tend to 
still trump more localised, more complex and seemingly less urgent Hemispheric 
issues. 
 
(2) The region has long looked to the US and the ‘Washington consensus’ for 
guidance on a host of economic issues, from macroeconomic policy and financial 
flows to finance growth. The current Wall Street crisis has begun to spread into the 
emerging markets of Latin America and produced forecasts of substantial slow-
downs in growth, effectively ending a period of accelerating economic growth that 
ran from 2002 to 2007. The likely slow-down in the US economic activity will have 
broad, if yet undetermined, consequences for the Western Hemisphere and the 
rest of the world. Economic turbulence will severely impact the implementation of 
any new regional policy for the next Administration, restrict available resources 
and place a new premium on stimulating growth in the US import economy while 
reigniting foreign investment. 
 
(3) The overall direction of US-Latin American relations remains closely linked to 
complex and difficult US domestic issues such as immigration reform, homeland 
and border security concerns including the border fence with Mexico, US domestic 
drug consumption and drug laws, and the prevailing public attitude towards open 
markets, free trade and international competition. Achieving real energy security 
with emphasis on renewable and clean sources of power may well be the greatest 
domestic challenge facing the US. Subsequently, it is hard to see how attitudes 
towards the US and its policies will change significantly in Latin America without 
movement on these critical domestic issues. The old adage about the US needing 
to lead by example remains fundamental to revitalising its ties with Latin America. 
 
(4) Many Latin American nations –led by Brazil and Venezuela– have adopted new 
strategies for integration as well as national agendas that –at least until the current 
economic crisis– allowed for the flexing of new found agricultural, energy and 
financial muscle. With this economic heft comes a greater desire to control one’s 
political future. Subsequently, from the establishment of the Union of South 
American Nations (UNASUR) and the convening of a December Latin America 
summit without the US to the establishment of a South American rival to the IMF 
(Banco Sur) and breaks with the dictates of the World Bank and the International 
Monetary Fund, South America is demonstrating a desire for greater political and 
economic autonomy from the US. Even strong trade partners of the US such as 
Chile and Mexico have signed dozens of free trade agreements in all parts of the 









world and seek more agile and diverse integration into the global economy. Latin 
Americans are making progress against the traditional asymmetry that dominated 
relations between the North and Southern hemispheres during the 20th century. 
The entry of China and India into the global economy, coupled with the steady 
presence of the EU and a more activist Russia, will ensure the field of Latin 
America’s potential international partners remains diversified. The diplomatic 
leverage and economic influence of the US remains important but it is undergoing 
comparative decline. The new Administration must make quick adjustments to 
accommodate these changing realities. 
 
(5) Since 2001, Latin America has moved further to the left of the political spectrum. 
Popular disenchantment with many aspects of the Washington Consensus and the 
structural reforms of the 1990s have resulted in a nostalgic shift back to more 
state-centric, socialist solutions. Yet the Latin American left is far from monolithic 
and is divided between a majority of nations like Brazil, Chile and Uruguay that 
subscribe to a moderate, market-friendly social democratic course with expanding 
safety nets and the more aggressive, illiberal, authoritarian ‘socialism of the 21st 
century’ espoused by Venezuela’s President Hugo Chávez and members of the 
Bolivarian Alternative for the Americas (ALBA.). Chávez’s desire to become the 
energising axis for Latin America’s socialist integration as well a pivotal player in a 
multi-polar world that freezes out capitalism, globalisation and weakens the US is 
ambitious for the leader of a coalition of poor states whose combined GDP is 
equivalent to that of the state of Illinois. The next US President will have to bank 
his hopes for the future with serious and responsible nations and leaders, even if 
they follow social democratic and sometimes even nationalistic policies. 
 
While most in the US recognise that Latin America is no longer the ‘backyard’ of the US, 
that region remains very much part of the same neighbourhood and its problems will have 
a deep and enduring impact on the next Administration. 
 
The Bush Legacy: Was George W. Bush So Bad for Latin America? 
As in many areas of foreign policy competency, the Democratic candidate Barack Obama 
claims that the US ‘has been negligent toward our friends, ineffective with our 
adversaries, disinterested (sic) in the challenges that matter in people’s lives, and 
incapable of advancing our [US] interests in the region’. Many outsiders will interpret an 
Obama victory in November as confirmation of this harsh critique. 
 
The Bush Administration has been maligned by academics, the Left, and much of the 
media in the US and abroad. Such criticism is based on the decline of the popular appeal 
of the US –the result of actions taken in defence of its national security such as the war 
against radical Islam and the Iraq War, as well as its unilateralism in the face of gridlock in 
international bodies and for its often misunderstood doctrine of ‘pre-emptive war’–. As a 
result, little credit is given to the substantial accomplishments of the Bush Administration 
in the Americas. 
 
Under President Bush, the levels of foreign assistance doubled over those of the Clinton 
Administration. The Bush Administration launched two major initiatives to tackle global 
development and health challenges. For instance, its Millennium Challenge Corporation 
(MCC), first proposed in 2002, has begun disbursing nearly US$1 billion to six of Latin 
America’s poorer nations. The President’s Emergency Program for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) 









has dedicated billions for the global fight against HIV/AIDS and is saving millions of lives 
world-wide, including in focus countries in the Caribbean. 
 
Sticking with Plan Colombia, begun under the Clinton Administration, the Bush 
Administration employed a strategy that granted support to counter-drug and counter-
insurgency efforts leading to a virtual re-founding of the Colombian state. With steady US 
assistance, Colombia is no longer in danger of becoming a failed narco-state and is 
making substantial headway against the armed left and right and large drug cartels. Such 
progress has resulted in the demobilisation of over 30,000 paramilitaries, falling rates of 
homicides and kidnappings, and major improvements in control of national territory. 
 
The Bush Administration has saved thousands of innocent lives in Colombia that would 
have been lost to political and drug-related violence. While not defeated, the narco-
terrorists of the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) have been reduced to 
pre-1990s numbers and suffered a precipitous decline in international support. 
 
The Bush Administration completed and won congressional approval of free trade 
agreements with Chile (2004), the Central American-Dominican Republic Free Trade 
Agreement (CAFTA-DR) (2005) and Peru (2007). It negotiated but has not yet ratified free 
trade agreements with Colombia and Panama. The Democratic-controlled Congress, led 
by House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, has played hardball with the Bush Administration and 
indefinitely tabled the legislation for political rather than economic reasons. If the 
Congress were to pass the pending agreements, the US would have a chain of steady 
trading partners stretching from Canada to Chile. 
 
The Administration worked hard to solidify ties with Brazil, capitalising on a good personal 
relationship between Presidents Bush and Luiz Inácio ‘Lula’ da Silva. The US-Brazil Bio-
fuels Partnership committed the two nations to work together to develop regional and 
global markets for ethanol and bio-diesel, which are critical to Central America and 
Caribbean efforts to improve energy security and sustainable development. 
 
A US$1.5 billion, three-year assistance package for Mexico and Central America, known 
as the Mérida Initiative, passed Congress earlier this year. The Bush Administration rightly 
states that this plan began with an unprecedented appeal for help by the Mexican 
President Felipe Calderón and that the Initiative was developed with input from both 
sides, creating a new paradigm for US-Mexican security and anti-drug competition. The 
Security and Prosperity Partnership with Canada and Mexico has established a forum and 
a framework for dealing with a variety of regulatory and security issues shared with two of 
the US’s top three trading partners. 
 
Numerous Bush Administration policies towards Latin America have gone overlooked. For 
instance, under the current Administration, there has been a sharp increase in debt 
forgiveness of billions of dollars for the most indebted nations in the Western Hemisphere. 
Additionally, the Department of Defence and the US Southern Command have helped to 
forge new security concepts and partnerships aimed at dealing with a broad array of non-
traditional transnational threats ranging from drug trafficking and international terrorism to 
emergency responses to hurricanes, migration crises, and environmental threats. 
 
The Bush Administration has found the rise of the rise of radical populism –with its 
tendency to use electoral mandates to concentrate and perpetuate authoritarian powers, 
to silence opposition, and to destroy the checks and balances essential to liberal 









democracy– to be an unhelpful turn of events in Latin America. The Bush Administration 
has displayed limited tolerance for the totalitarian system of Cuban communists, for the 
increasingly radical antics of Hugo Chávez or for the heavy-handed misrule of the 
Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega, whose old fashioned anti-Americanism helps keep 
Nicaragua among the poorest and worst governed countries in the Americas. 
 
Yet modest assistance to beleaguered democratic parties in the Western Hemisphere and 
occasional critical jabs delivered by Washington officials are far cries from the substantial 
inter-American interventions of the Cold War era. The US sat cautiously on the sidelines 
during numerous critical Latin American elections, such as that of Mexico in 2006. Most 
recently, the State Department has followed a ‘no response policy’ when attacked by 
Chávez, resisting, for example, the call from many quarters to place Venezuela on the list 
of state-sponsors of terror following the revelations of extensive support provided by 
Chávez for the narco-terrorism of the FARC. 
 
It is a reasonable proposition that some months or years ahead, Latin Americans with the 
exception of Bolivia and Venezuela will look back with considerable nostalgia at the Bush 
Administration’s Latin American policy. 
 
The Latin American Policy of Barack Obama 
The son of a Kenyan immigrant father and a white mother, Barack Obama is a 47 year-old 
Columbia University and Harvard Law School-educated, first term senator from Illinois. 
While he spent part of his childhood in Indonesia and serves on the powerful Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee, Obama has yet to visit Latin America. 
 
Obama promises a new partnership with Latin America, one that he claims will renew US 
engagement with the Americas. Overall, the outlines of Obama’s foreign policy for the 
world and the region are being shaped by key players from the Clinton Administration 
such as the former National Security Adviser Tony Lake, the former Clinton advisor Greg 
Craig and the former Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Susan Rice. Younger 
guns, such as Daniel Restrepo from the Center for American Progress, and the former 
Clinton official Frank Sanchez have taken the point for the Obama campaign on Latin 
American issues. Former senior Department of State officials, such as Ambassadors 
Peter Romero and Robert Gelbard, are ready to help while Senator Christopher Dodd (D-
Conn), chairman of the subcommittee of the Western Hemisphere, and Governor Bill 
Richardson of New Mexico appear to have played a role in shaping Obama’s Latin 
American outlook and policy proposals. 
 
If elected, Obama will display a new persona to the citizens of the Americas. As one 
supporter observed recently: just imagine the reaction when President Obama lands for 
the first time in multi-racial Brazil. Obama will undoubtedly generate tremendous media 
appeal in many quarters and will capitalise on his identity as the first non-white US 
president, on his charisma, youth, energy and abundant rhetorical skills to usher in an 
aura of change. 
 
The Obama camp believes it can recapture the diplomatic high ground and is attempting 
to reach inspirational heights, drawing heavily upon the policies of heroes enshrined in the 
pantheon of the Democratic Party, such as Franklin D. Roosevelt’s ‘Good Neighbour’ and 
John F. Kennedy’s ‘Alliance for Progress’. In one campaign rally, Obama went so far as to 
promise an ‘Alliance for Progress for the 21st Century’. Campaigners for Obama have 
also rediscovered FDR’s Four Freedoms speech and the inspiring vision of the 1941 









Atlantic Charter; a current campaign mantra says ‘What’s good for the people of Latin 
America is good for the people of the United States’. 
 
Stressing that he will be a listener rather than a talker, Obama promises a dialogue of 
mutual respect and relationships of equality with Latin Americans. The US will no longer, 
he claims, talk down to Latin Americans. As the Democratic Platform states, ‘we must turn 
the page on the arrogance in Washington and the anti-Americanism across the region that 
stands in the way of progress’. Promised changes in voice and style will constitute much 
of the new approach to the Hemisphere: diplomacy will now be conducted in the 
measured tones of the Harvard Law Review rather than a Texas accent. 
 
One of the first actions Obama promises is re-establishing a special envoy for the 
Americas, a measure that harkens back to the Clinton Administration and is designed to 
show that Washington is again paying attention to Latin America. For much of his 
presidency, Bill Clinton –with apparent success– charged his close confidant Mack 
McClarty with injecting the US into regional politics. Under Obama, much will hinge on 
selecting a Special Envoy with access to the President and the White House inner circle 
and a leader able to corral and co-opt the bureaucracy to accomplish the ends of the 
Administration. 
 
The Obama camp also recommends change on certain key issues: 
 
• Cuba: It promises a two-step approach. The first step will be removal of restrictions on 
family visits and remittances to Cuba followed by presenting the Cuban regime with 
what it terms a ‘transition option’ urging the unconditional release of political prisoners 
as a first step towards a reciprocal lifting of the US embargo and the lure of 
normalised diplomatic relations. Citing the examples of Richard Nixon and Ronald 
Reagan, Obama indicates that under certain circumstances he is prepared to enter 
into direct diplomacy with Cuba’s Raul Castro. 
 
• Colombia: Obama promises to continue the Andean Counter-Drug Program, to 
support Colombia’s fight against the FARC and to end the terror of the paramilitaries; 
all positions largely staked out in the Bush Administration. Contrary to reigning Latin 
American opinion, Obama affirmed support for ‘Colombia’s right to strike terrorists 
who seek safe-haven (sic) across its borders’, an endorsement of Colombia’s strike 
against the camp of FARC leader Raul Reyes in March that caused a crisis in 
relations with Ecuador and threats of war by Hugo Chávez. On the other hand, 
Obama will likely pair with senior Democratic officials on the Hill to continue 
expressing displeasure over the alleged right-wing ties of the Colombian President 
Alvaro Uribe and will ration funding for military assistance in Plan Colombia, preparing 
for more ‘soft-side’ support to deal with demobilisation, reintegration and other human 
security issues in Colombia. Obama has expressed opposition to the Colombian Free 
Trade Agreement as it stands and vows to ‘end impunity’ and improve accountability 
in Colombia, to demand greater protection for Colombian trade unionists and stiffer 
labour and environmental conditions before passage. 
 
• Mexico: Obama’s views on Mexico are less clear. In 2007, he noted that ‘our complex 
relationship with Mexico has become captive of a single issue: the immigration 
debate’. Obama continues to recommend both increased border security and 
comprehensive immigration reform but has offered few specifics other than urging a 
path to citizenship for the estimated 12 million presently in the US illegally. He has 









indicated that he will build on the counter-drug efforts of the Mérida Initiative but 
stresses the need to redouble demand reduction efforts in the US and to stem the flow 
of guns, cash and precursor chemicals from the US into Mexico. 
 
• Trade: On trade, Obama has adopted positions championed by critical Democratic 
constituencies such as organised labour. The Obama stance on free trade includes 
the controversial promise to renegotiate the North American Free Trade Agreement 
and to review other agreements such as the CAFTA-DR treaty which Obama 
opposed. The Democratic candidate also promises to support ‘fair’ trade, a concept 
freighted with all sorts of hidden protectionist and obstructionist possibilities that might 
stall future trade deals indefinitely. 
 
• Economic development/poverty reduction: In campaign literature, the Obama team 
promises to double spending for foreign assistance, expand the Peace Corps, develop 
a greater diplomatic presence in the Americas and support broad, deep institutional 
change throughout the region. ‘It is’, he says, ‘time for the United States to again be a 
beacon of hope and a helping hand’. Obama pledges a renewed assault on poverty, 
promising to launch what he calls a ‘bottom-up’ approach. In a key speech in May, 
Obama claimed that ‘after decades pressing for top-down reform, we need an agenda 
that advances democracy, security, and opportunity from the bottom up. That means 
measuring success not just through agreements among governments, but also 
through the hopes of the child in the favelas of Rio, the security for the policeman in 
Mexico, and the shrinking of the distance between Miami and Havana’. 
 
Space does not permit a discussion of other ideas. An Obama Administration would 
certainly attempt a return to greater multilateralism, seeking to breathe renewed life in the 
Organisation of American States (OAS). Brazil would loom large as a courted partner. 
Finally, energy policy, climate change and the environment will likely receive top billing on 
the Hemispheric agenda of the Obama Administration. 
 
The Latin American Policy of John McCain 
John McCain, a decorated Navy pilot who spent seven years as a Prisoner of War in a 
North Vietnamese prison, entered the Senate in 1986. The 72-year old Republican Party 
candidate was born in the Panama Canal Zone, considered at the time US territory, and 
has visited Latin America on numerous occasions in the line of senatorial duty. As a 
Senator from Arizona, McCain has been intimately involved in a wide range of border-
related issues and was a major proponent of the Comprehensive Immigration Reform Act 
of 2007 that failed to win congressional approval. McCain also spent 15 years as 
Chairman of the democracy-supporting International Republican Institute. In July, he 
visited Colombia and Mexico to demonstrate support for two key regional players. 
 
McCain draws advice and support on policy issues from a smaller, less well-known body 
of colleagues than Obama. Randy Scheunemann, a former legislative aide and 
consultant, serves as his foreign policy coordinator and Robert Kagan, of the Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, worked extensively in the Department of State on 
Central American issues in the 1980s. Former diplomats such as Ambassador Otto Reich 
and a former AID official, Adolfo Franco, have also worked on Latin American issues. In 
the critical state of Florida, advice has reportedly been tendered by members of Congress 
from Miami, notably by the Cuban-Americans Ilena Ros-Lehtinen and Lincoln and Mario 
Diaz-Balart. Certainly, the McCain camp has access to the knowledge and experience of 
those who developed and executed President Bush’s policies in the Western Hemisphere. 









At first blush, it appears the policy of a McCain presidency might represent considerable 
conceptual continuity with the regional policies of the Bush Administration. Nonetheless, 
McCain promises to ‘forge a new policy… founded on peace and security, shared 
prosperity, democracy and freedom, and mutual respect’. 
 
An emphasis on free trade and market-led development, a tough stance on drugs and a 
focus on cementing and rewarding friendships with key countries like Brazil, Colombia 
and Mexico would serve as the foundations for the McCain policy. As a fighter and a 
security-minded President, McCain will likely feel challenged by Hugo Chávez, who would 
undoubtedly work to increase a sense of US-Venezuelan confrontation as a wedge 
between the US and Latin America, or by Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua, whose links with 
the Central American conflicts of the 1980s invite antagonism. McCain would worry about 
ungoverned spaces, fighting crime and stemming endemic corruption. The growing 
encroachment of Russia, Iran and other extra-hemispheric troublemakers in the region 
would also awaken historical security concerns about the protection of democracy and 
freedom in the Americas. 
 
• Cuba: McCain promises not to ‘passively await the long-overdue demise of the Castro 
dictatorship’ and not to reward the Cuban communist regime for mere cosmetic 
economic changes. He proposes ‘an active dialogue with Hemispheric and European 
partners’ to promote democratic change in Cuba. As President, McCain would tend to 
preserve the fundamentals of Helms-Burton legislation regarding restrictions on Cuba 
trade and adhere to a strategy for a through democratic transition specified by the 
Commission for Assistance to a Free Cuba. McCain also proposes to energise 
support for dissident, pro-human rights, pro-democracy groups inside and outside of 
Cuba. 
 
• Colombia: McCain sees the US as having made an enduring commitment to 
Colombia’s future and worries about what backing away from Colombia and the 
pending trade deal will do to Bogotá’s future trust of the US. He sees the current 
impasse as denying US producers an excellent opportunity to broaden market share 
in Colombia in exchange for trade benefits Colombia is currently receiving. 
 
• Mexico: McCain supports Plan Mérida for combating drug cartels and calls for the 
creation of a prosperous Mexico. He promises to make immigration reform a 
cornerstone of the next Administration but must work to rebuild a comprehensive plan 
that addresses aspects as diverse as temporary work permits, employee verification, 
sanctions for workplace violations and the future legal status of an estimated 12 
million illegal residents in the US. 
 
• Brazil: McCain has recognised Brazil’s leadership role at the United Nations and its 
support for peacekeeping in Haiti. He sees Brazil and others as potential recruits for a 
‘Global League of Democracy’. In the last presidential debate, McCain proposed 
repealing the 55 cent/gallon tax on Brazil’s sugar-based ethanol. 
 
• Trade: McCain recognises the importance of export performance to the US economy 
and argues that export-led growth has a significant domestic payoff in terms of job 
creation and job quality. He promises more aggressive attention to creating export 
jobs and to developing trade-enhancing capacities within the US government, 
including the establishment of a trade export authority. McCain recognises trade as a 
tool and will use the White House to battle against a return to protectionist/mercantilist 









strategies of the past. One area for further executive leadership under McCain would 
be to restart the Doha round of trade negotiations and adopting a tougher stance on 
trade-distorting US farm subsidies. He would most certainly provide continued follow-
up with the Bush Administration’s September initiative aimed at coordinating actions 
among trade partners known as ‘Pathways to Prosperity’ and has not abandoned the 
idea of a Free Trade of the Americas agreement. 
 
20 January 2009: When Promises and Reality Converge 
On 20 January 2009, either John McCain or Barack Obama will take the presidential oath 
of office and assume the vast, global responsibilities entailed by occupying the Oval 
Office. The US, Latin America and the world will face a new era, one that, for the first time 
in two decades, does not feature a Bush or a Clinton in the White House. Expectations 
will run high. 
 
While Washington pundits and the development community will stress the deep structural 
challenges presented by poverty, inequality and ethnic divisions in the Americas, the 
Pentagon, the Central Intelligence Agency, the Department of Justice and Homeland 
Security will dust off policies and plans to deal with the gamut of threats from alien 
smuggling and drug trafficking to insurgency and terrorism. 
 
The new President will have to make favourable contacts with dozens of leaders, from 
heavyweights like Brazil’s Lula da Silva and Mexico’s Calderón to Prime Ministers of small 
friendly nations such as Barbados and Uruguay. Indirectly via press statements and 
diplomatic manoeuvres, the new President will send signals to Hugo Chávez, Evo 
Morales, Daniel Ortega and the Castroite gerontocracy that rules Cuba. By January 21, 
the next President will be immersed in the hardball world of code-word security briefs and 
White House situation room meetings, where bad guys seldom sleep, where terrorists, 
criminals and insurgents exploit ungoverned space and the weakness of governments, 
where a 3am telephone call and crisis management situation might be just an incident 
away. 
 
Either McCain or Obama will be expected to articulate a broader vision for the 
Hemisphere and set the tone for four years at the Summit of the Americas in Trinidad & 
Tobago in April 2009. This will give most of the leaders of the Hemisphere their first real 
look at the new President. 
 
If Barack Obama is elected President he will more than likely command ample Democratic 
support in the House of Representatives and the Senate, whereas McCain will face an 
uphill struggle to accomplish a successful policy agenda and need to concentrate to re-
forging bipartisan strategies. 
 
An Obama victory also means a potential for an initial period of bureaucratic bloodletting 
and in-fighting that could cut deep into the current ranks of policy makers and immobilise 
the policy-making bureaucracy for months. Following through on ambitious promises of a 
‘new partnership’ and ‘bottom-up reform’ will require broad reviews of existing policies and 
potential bureaucratic reorganisation as well as lengthy lead time to request resources for 
new initiatives and move them to legislation in Congress. 
 
A danger facing an Obama presidency could be overselling the promise of change in US 
policy unsupported by fresh resources or genuine US commitments. As President, Obama 
will also have to avoid fragmentation and discipline dovish, protectionist, pacifist, 









isolationist elements that flourish within the ranks of the Democratic Party. The challenge 
will be doing more than cosmetic rearrangements that leave Latin America questioning 
Washington’s readiness to change policy that serves a broad spectrum of US interests 
from economic growth to security. 
 
If McCain wins, his programmes will be easier to implement because they will be built on 
continuity and some serving officials will remain in place until suitable replacements are 
identified and confirmed. The challenge for McCain will be to show Latin Americans that 
he takes the region seriously and is ready to explore new lines of cooperation and 
partnership in accordance with changed geopolitical realities that go beyond the present 
Bush Administration. 
 
Conclusion: An overriding need will be restoring the health of the international economic 
system as quickly as possible and keeping the US running as the central motor for 
Hemispheric growth and prosperity. These challenges will require addressing trade and 
energy issues as well as good governance, rule of law and poverty reduction. They will 
also require keeping vigilant eyes on Hemispheric security and on an array of difficult 
threats. 
 
In the longer run, the coming US presidential election offers an opportunity for greater 
conceptual boldness in addressing the challenges of Latin America’s urgent social 
agenda. There is still a hunger for the American brand and a large audience in the rising 
and aspiring social base that lies between traditional elites and a state-dependent poverty 
class and yearns for genuine democracy, good governance, sound institutions and rule of 
law. Either Presidents McCain or Obama will need to weave the successes (and the 
failures) of the Bush Administration into new policy initiatives that optimise opportunity and 
that combine new strategies of partnership with the reassertion of the US historic and 
productive leadership role in the Western Hemisphere. 
 
Ray Walser PhD 
Senior Policy Analyst for Latin America, The Heritage Foundation, Washington DC 
